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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKETTA ALLEN, '] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
i JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
f ?eyoj> 
i Civil No.: C88-2411 
\ Judge Noel 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment coming 
before the Court for oral argument on August 4, 1989, the Court 
having read the briefs submitted by the parties and having 
considered the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that under 
the facts of this case that the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
the defendant is proper as set forth in the arguments of 
defendant, and there being no just reason for delay of entry of 
this final order, and there being no genuine issue of any 
material fact, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and 
plaintiff's claims against defendant are dismissed with 
prejudice. ^ 
SO ORDERED this ""Hay of /^kfk&O, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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-rnLufhL Ua/jh* 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKETTA ALLEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 890408 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
District Judge 
HANSEN, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
T.J. Tsakalos 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2970 
Telephone: 363-7611 
H. RALPH KLEMM 
349 South 200 East, Suite 560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-2206 
Attorney for Appellant 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I: LACK OF ADHERENCE TO PROPER 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS REQUIRE THE 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION. 
1 
2 
2 
3 
5 
POINT NO. II 
POINT NO. Ill 
POINT NO. IV: 
POINT NO. V: 
CONCLUSION 
THE BASIS FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REMAINS UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME. 
THE ADHESION CONTRACT THEORY IS 
A VALID AND VIABLE CONCEPT OF LAW 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE ALLEN 
HOMEOWNER POLICY RELATING TO THE 
HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION ARE HOPELESSLY 
AMBIGUOUS 
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD APPLY 
THE CONCEPTS OF THE WAGNER CASE TO 
THE MATTER ON APPEAL 
10 
15 
18 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
e 
Accord Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb, 
643 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1982) . 11, 
Darner Motor Sales, Inc., v. Universal Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, 395 (1984) 
(en banc) . . . . . . . . . 12 
Estep v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 
703 P.2d 882, 887 (N.M. 1985) 13 
Farmer's Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (1985) 11, 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 
(1983) 10, 
Hawaiian Insurance & Guarantee Co. v. Brooks, 686 P.2d 23 
(Hawaii 1984) 14 
Keeten, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy 
Provisions, 83, Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 (1970) 15 
Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(1989) 2d 8 
State Farm's Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Mastbaum, 748 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1987) 11, 
Sturla, Inc., v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 
67 Haw. 203, 209-10, 684 P.2d 960, 964 (1984) 15 
Thompson v, Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d. 334, 384, P.2d 109 8 
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820, 824 
(Mont. 1983) 11, 
Wagner v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 125 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 62; P.2d , (1990) 2, 7, 
12, 18, 
19, 20 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKETTA ALLEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 890408 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court by the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 78-2-2(3)(i), 
which provides that the Utah Supreme Court has appellant 
jurisdiction over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff brought this Declaratory Judgment action 
against her own insurance company to invalidate an endorsement 
attached to her homeowner policy that excluded liability coverage 
for some of the named insureds. She relied upon the Adhesion 
Contract Theory as a legal basis for invalidation of the 
1 
endorsement9 and her Complaint alleged facts that support her 
theory. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows: 
1. Should the Supreme Court summarily reverse the 
lower court's decision for manifest error in failing to open and 
publish the depositions upon which it relied for a factual basis 
for its Judgment of Dismissal? 
2. Should the Supreme Court send the case back to the 
District Court for a clarification of the grounds for its 
decision to grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
3. Does the State of Utah recognize adhesion 
contracts? If so, was there sufficient evidence in the record to 
establish that the Allen insurance policy was an adhesion 
contract? 
4. Were the provisions of the Allen homeowner policy 
relating to the household exclusion endorsement clear and 
unambiguous? 
5. Should the Supreme Court apply the principles laid 
down in Wagner v. Farmer's Insurance Company to the facts of this 
action? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed the declaratory judgment action against 
her own insurance company to invalidate the household endorsement 
in her homeowner policy that excluded liability coverage for the 
Allen family. She relied upon the Adhesion Contract Theory as a 
2 
legal basis for the invalidation of the endorsement, and her 
Complaint sought relief under that theory. 
The case arose when a negligence action was filed 
against Mrs. Allen to recover personal injury damages sustained 
by her minor child, Ryan Allen. The negligence Complaint alleges 
that Ryan was seriously injured and burned when Mrs. Allen 
negligently and carelessly caused boiling water to fall on him. 
Prudential Insurance Company denied liability coverage for the 
accident and cited the household endorsement attached to its 
policy as a reason for that denial. 
Plaintiff took the deposition of Russell Mower, the 
selling agent who represented the insurance company when the 
Aliens bought the homeowner policy. The defendant took the 
depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Allen and then immediately filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, with the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, granted defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and entered a Judgment of Dismissal in favor of 
the defendant. The trial court thereby upheld the validity of 
the household exclusion endorsement attached to the policy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1981, Ashley and Blaketta Allen purchased Homeowner 
Policy No. 51-6H391346 from Prudential Insurance Company. Mr. 
Russell Mower was the selling agent for the company. (Answer par. 
4; A.Allen depo., pp. 9-10) 
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Mr. Mower came to the Allen home on May 6, 1981 to 
discuss the homeowner insurance. Although Mrs. Allen was in the 
house at the time of the meeting, she did not participate in the 
actual discussion about the homeowner policy between the agent 
and her husband. She told Mr. Mower that she didn't understand 
insurance matters and that she would have to leave it up to the 
agent to do what was right for the family. But she understood at 
that time that she and her children would also be insured under 
the policy. (B.Allen depo. pp.12-18) 
When Mr. Mower visited with Mr. Allen at his home on 
May 6, 1981, it was the first time Allen had ever sat down with 
an insurance agent to buy insurance for himself. In purchasing 
the homeowner policy in question, Mr. Allen just followed the 
agent's recommendations. He trusted the agent completely, and he 
relied on the agent to give him the coverage he needed for his 
family. He intended to cover his children with insurance 
benefits when he bought the policy, and he always thought they 
were covered under the policy. (A.Allen depo. pp. 22-24 and 74-
76) 
The insurance agent testified during his deposition 
that he did not explain the household exclusion attached to the 
Allen policy to the buyers when he sold them the policy. He 
merely told them that they should read the policy when they 
received it. (Mower depo. pp. 17,22) 
About a year after they bought the policy, the Aliens 
purchased a trampoline for the family. Mr. Allen then called Mr. 
4 
Mower and asked him to increase his coverage and to make sure 
that anyone who got hurt on the trampoline would be covered. He 
told the agent that he was really concerned about the trampoline 
and that he wanted to make sure he had full coverage under the 
policy to cover such an eventuality. He intended to cover his 
own children for such injuries, and he thought he had such 
coverage under the policy. (A.Allen depo. pp. 28,75-76) 
On April 18, 1984 the Aliens1 minor son Ryan was 
seriously injured when a pan of hot water fell on him. (B.Allen 
depo., p. 5; Answer, par. 12) Mr. Allen called the insurance 
agent the following day and told him about the accident. Mr. 
Mower then informed him that there was an exclusion in the policy 
and that Prudential wouldn't pay for any injuries to members of 
the Allen family. This was the first time that Mr. Allen was 
advised about the endorsement in the policy. (A.Allen depo. 
pp.32-33) 
When a negligence action was filed against Mrs. Allen 
to recover damages for the injuries suffered by Ryan Allen, the 
insurance company declined to defend the case for her on grounds 
that the "household endorsement" excluded liability coverage for 
family members. This action was then initiated to invalidate the 
endorsement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A brief summary of the Arguments made by the plaintiff 
in support of her position in this action is as follows: 
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POINT NO. I: Procedural Error. The District Court 
failed to publish the depositions upon which it relied for a 
factual basis for its decision. This may entitle the plaintiff 
to a summary reversal of the case for manifest error because 
there was no factual basis for the granting of that Motion. 
POINT NO. II: Ground for Decision. Because the 
District Court based its decision on the arguments made by the 
defendant in its Memorandum of Authorities, it is difficult to 
determine the basis for the District Court's ruling. Since there 
appears to be multiple grounds on which the court could have 
based its ruling, the District Court should have complied with 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by issuing a brief 
statement of the ground for its decision• 
POINT NO. Ill: Adhesion Contract Theory. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized the concept of adhesion contracts, 
and the Adhesion Contract Theory has been expanded to include 
automobile insurance. The court should expand that concept 
further to include homeowner insurance policies. If the court 
ruled that the Adhesion Contract Theory is not applicable in 
Utah, then its ruling was legally erroneous and should be 
reversed. If the court ruled that there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to show that the Allen insurance policy 
was an adhesion contract, the ruling is equally erroneous and 
should be reversed. 
POINT NO. IV: Contract Ambiguity. In attempt to 
reconcile the household endorsement with the other portions of 
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the homeowner insurance policy reveals that the Allen homeowner 
policy is hopelessly ambiguous on that point. If the court ruled 
that the provisions of the household exclusion are clear and 
unambiguous, then the court erred in its rulingjand it should be 
reversed. 
POINT NO. V: New Concepts. The case of Wagner v. 
Farmer's Insurance Exchange gives a new look to the Adhesion 
Contract Theory, and the guidelines laid down in that case should 
be reviewed and followed by the court in resolving this action. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT NO. I 
LACK OF ADHERENCE TO PROPER PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
REQUIRES* THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
Appellant feels that an important procedural matter 
should be brought to the attention of the Appellate Court. When 
defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, it also 
submitted a Motion to Publish the Depositions of Ashley and 
Blaketta Allen. The second page of that Motion included an Order 
providing that the depositions be published by the court for use 
in determining the validity of plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Both parties filed extensive memoranda relating to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and oral argument was allowed by the 
court before it ruled on the Motion. Both parties assumed that 
the court had signed the Publication Order and that the two 
depositions had been published by the court. Reference was made 
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to the testimony of these two witnesses in the Briefs and in the 
oral argument. 
After the Notice of Appeal was filed by the plaintiff, 
counsel went to the office of the Third District Court to review 
the Record on Appeal for use in preparing his Brief. He then 
discovered for the first time that the Trial Judge had never 
signed the Order that provided for the publication of the 
depositions of the plaintiff and her husband. Only then did 
counsel for the plaintiff first realize that his client had 
grounds to file a Motion for Summary Reversal for Manifest Error 
because there was no factual basis for the granting of the 
Motion. Counsel has previously filed a Motion with this court 
for suspension of court rules to enable him to bring a Motion for 
Summary Reversal on those grounds. This Motion was denied 
pending the filing of Briefs, and the court may wish to consider 
the serious procedural error that was made by the District Court. 
This court has had occasion to reverse the Trial 
Court's decision and send the case back for further proceedings 
when the lower court failed to open the sealed depositions that 
it used as a factual basis for Entry of Summary Judgment. See 
Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d. 334, 384, P2d 109; Lowe 
v. Sorenson Research Co., 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1989) 
P2d. • 
POINT NO. II 
THE BASIS FOR THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REMAINS UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME. 
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When the Trial Judge granted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment he stated that he was basing his decision on the 
arguments made by the defendant in its Memorandum of Authorities. 
The Judgment of Dismissal entered by the court recites that the 
Trial Court "finds that under the facts of this case that the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant is proper as set 
forth in the arguments of the defendant." No additional oral or 
written statement was made by the court to explain the ground for 
its decision. 
A careful review of defendant's first Memorandum filed 
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment reveals that 
defendant initially based its Motion solely upon the argument 
that the household endorsement in question does not violate 
public policy. There is no discussion about the Adhesion 
Contract Theory in that Memorandum. 
Defendant's Reply Brief attempts to respond to 
plaintiff's argument about the Adhesion Contract Theory by 
asserting that plaintiff has provided no evidence to establish 
that the insurance policy was an adhesion contract when it was 
issued. In the alternative, assuming that the insurance policy 
was found to be an adhesion contract, defendant argued that the 
Contract Theory does not apply to homeowner policies and that the 
household endorsement in question was not ambiguous. 
Because of the posture of the two Memoranda filed by 
the defendant in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, it 
is difficult to determine the basis for the District Court's 
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ruling. It is hard to resolve whether the Trial Court recognized 
or rejected the Adhesion Contract Theory. Since there appears to 
be multiple grounds on which the court could have based its 
ruling, it would have been helpful if the District Court had 
complied with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by 
issuing a brief written statement of the ground for its decision. 
Nevertheless, plaintiff will attempt to discuss the pertinent 
matters raised in defendant's two supporting Briefs. 
POINT NO. Ill 
THE ADHESION CONTRACT THEORY IS A VALID AND VIABLE 
CONCEPT OF LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
In her Complaint, Mrs. Allen alleges that the household 
exclusion contained in her homeowner's insurance policy is not 
enforceable because the policy is an Adhesion Contract. She 
relies primarily on this theory as a basis for the issuance of 
the Declaratory Judgment that she seeks from the court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the concept of 
Adhesion Contracts. In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. 
Martinez, 668 P.2d 498 (1983) the court recognized that credit 
life and accident insurance are generally contracts of adhesion. 
Some of the requirements mandated by this concept are discussed 
by the court as follows: 
Credit life and accident insurance are generally 
contracts of adhesion which are not negotiated at arms 
length and which usually contain various provisions for 
protection of the interests of the insurance company. 
Because those who purchase such policies rely on the 
assumption that they are covered by the insurance they 
buy, the Legislature, in the interest of fair dealing, 
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has deemed it mandatory that an insured be given a copy 
of the policy so that he can take whatever action is 
appropriate to protect his interest and be assured that 
the coverage which he thinks he has contracted for is 
actually provided. It is not consonant with our 
statute for an insurance company to accept premiums and 
then deny liability on the ground of an exclusion of 
which the insured was not aware because the insurance 
company had never informed him of the exclusion or 
given him the means to ascertain its existence* 
The Utah Supreme Court expanded the Adhesion Contract 
Theory to automobile insurance in the case of Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (1985). After discussing its 
previous holding in the Martinez case, the court stated as 
follows: 
Although Martinez involved a statute requiring delivery 
of a credit life and disability policy to the insured, 
the public policy expressed is equally applicable to 
automobile insurance policies. Like credit life and 
disability insurance, automobile insurance is generally 
sold through adhesion contracts that are not negotiated 
at arm's length. Purchasers commonly rely on the 
assumption that they are fully covered by the insurance 
that they buy. Because of this, public policy requires 
that persons purchasing such policies are entitled to 
be informed, in writing of the essential terms of 
insurance contracts, especially exclusionary terms. 
Martinez, 668 P.2d at 501. 
We therefore hold that where the insurer fails to 
disclose material exclusions in an automobile insurance 
policy and the purchaser is not informed of them in 
writing, those exclusions are invalid. Without 
disclosure, the household exclusion clause fails to 
"honor the reasonable expectations" of the purchaser, 
rendering the exclusion clause invalid as to the entire 
policy limits. Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royle, 
Mont., 656 P.2d 820, 824 (1983); Accord Mutual of 
Enumclaw v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 543 P.2d 441 
(1982). 
In State Farm's Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Mastbaum. 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987) Justice Durham dissented 
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because the majority believed that the adhesion contract claim 
had not been properly raised in the appeal. She noted in her 
dissenting opinion that other Utah cases had recognized the 
adhesive nature of insurance policies because purchasers commonly 
rely on the assumption that they are fully covered by the 
insurance they buy. 
In the recent case of Wagner v. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 62; P.2d , (1990), the 
Utah Court of Appeals recognized that automobile insurance is 
generally sold through adhesion contracts and that the courts 
should give effect to the "reasonable expectations" of the 
injured party, even though that concept may be quite troublesome 
under some circumstances. The language of the court is 
noteworthy, and it reads as follows: 
We recognize that "automobile insurance is generally 
sold through adhesion contracts that are not negotiated 
at arm's length, and that "[p]urchasers commonly rely 
on the assumption that they are fully covered by the 
insurance that they buy." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 
712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985); see also Darner Motor 
Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 
Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, 395 (1984) (en banc). Where 
possible, we attempt to give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the insured party. 
The recognition by Utah courts that insurance policies 
are commonly adhesion contracts is also supported by other 
jurisdictions. In Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb, 
643 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1982) the Washington Supreme Court said: 
. . . . to say there is freedom of contract in these 
cases is to ignore reality. A number of insurers in 
this state will not sell a policy without the family or 
household exclusion. 
* * * 
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Such a state of affairs undercuts any assertion that 
the parties are free to contract for.this coverage. 
The contract analysis might be persuasive if this were 
a coverage that one could choose to purchase or not 
purchase from each insurer. The present arrangement, 
however, is a take it or leave it proposition. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court said: 
The discussion in Wiscomb of the "take it or leave it" 
nature of obtaining automobile liability coverage, and 
the effect of the policy's exclusion on third parties 
who are or may be ignorant of the insurance 
arrangements and unable or incompetent to contract for 
coverage for themselves, illustrates the fragility of 
any assertion that the terms of this or similar 
insurance policies truly are the product of conscious 
bargaining between the parties. The argument might be 
more credibly made were there evidence that insureds 
had been, or traditionally are, offered the choice of 
including or excluding coverage for family members. 
There is no such evidence in this record. 
Estep v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 703 P.2d 882, 887 
(N.M. 1985). See also Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Royle, 656 
P.2d 820, 824 (Mont. 1983). 
The insurance policy which is the subject of this suit 
has the characteristics of an adhesion contract. The Aliens 
relied completely on the insurance company's agent to provide 
them with coverage sufficient to meet their needs. The 
defendant's agent did not discuss the household exclusion with 
the Aliens prior to their purchase of the policy. The Aliens 
were not given the opportunity to review or read the policy until 
it arrived in the mail some two months later. The Aliens were 
offered no choice on whether to include or exclude coverage for 
family members in the policy, and there was no bargaining between 
the parties regarding that coverage. When the adhesion contract 
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doctrine is applied to insurance policies, the courts must 
determine the meaning of the contract that the insured would 
reasonably €>xpect. The evidence in the two Allen depositions 
clearly establishes the adhesive nature of their homeowner 
policy* 
Because of the nature, purpose and similarity of the 
liability provisions of automobile and homeowner insurance 
policies, the above cases apply equally as well to the homeowner 
variety. The sales characteristics are the same in both types of 
policies, and the lack of bargaining opportunities appears in 
both instances. 
One of the major arguments made by the defendant's 
counsel concerned the plaintiff's failure to read her insurance 
policy once it was mailed to the family by the insurance company. 
There is ample authority to establish that the Adhesion Contract 
Theory is viable even though the insured has failed to read the 
insurance policy. See State Farm v. Mastbaum, Supra, p.1047, 
where Justice Durham points out that "an insureds complete 
failure to read the policy's provisions, exclusions, or 
limitations may not be determinative of his reasonable 
expectations unless the insurer can demonstrate that the failure 
to read was unreasonable." See also Hawaiian Insurance & 
Guarantee Co. v. Brooks, 686 P.2d 23 (Hawaii 1984) where the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii, stated as follows: 
We are guided in the task by the broad principle 
that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of 
[policyholders] and intended beneficiaries regarding 
the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even 
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though painstaking study of the policy provisions would 
have negated those expectations." Keeten, Insurance 
Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83, 
Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 )1970); see also Sturla, Inc. v. 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 67 Haw. 203, 209-10, 684 
P.2d 960, 964 (1984). 
In summary then, Utah Law recognizes the Adhesion 
Contract Theory, and failure to read the contract does not 
necessarily bar recovery by the insured* If the Trial Court 
ruled that the State of Utah does not recognize the Adhesion 
Contract Theory, then its ruling was clearly erroneous and should 
be reversed by the Appellate Court. On the other hand, if the 
Trial Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence in the 
record to show that the Allen homeowner insurance policy was an 
adhesion contract, the ruling is equally erroneous and should be 
corrected on this appeal. 
POINT NO. IV 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE ALLEN HOMEOWNER 
POLICY RELATING TO THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION 
ARE HOPELESSLY AMBIGUOUS 
It must be remembered that the Allen homeowner policy 
itself did not contain or include any reference to the household 
exclusion. The exclusion came in the form of an attachment that 
was stapled to the policy along with a number of other 
attachments. The words of the attachment are short, and the 
meaning is unclear. It says: 
Under Coverage - Personal Liability, this policy does not 
apply to bodily injury or to any Insured under parts (1) and 
(2) of the definition of "Insured." 
In the upper right hand corner of the attachment in 
bold type we find the words "PERSONAL LIABILITY - SECTION II". 
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These words ought to give the reader some guidance as to the 
meaning and purpose of this document. It can reasonably be 
presumed that the attachment refers to Section II. 
After a diligent search of the body of the policy, the 
reader finds Section II, which is labeled "COVERAGES", on page 3 
HO-3. The policy immediately discusses "COVERAGE E - PERSONAL 
LIABILITY." Unfortunately, no definitions are included in the 
Coverages Section. On the next page (4 HO-3) the policy includes 
the exclusions to Coverage E, none of which are relevant here. 
The next category is entitled "SUPPLEMENTARY COVERAGES," which 
also makes no reference to any definitions. 
On the bottom of page 4 HO-3, we find a section 
entitled "ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS", where the average policy 
reader might hope for some guidance to unlock this mystery. His 
hopes are first lifted significantly when he reads the words, 
"The following definitions apply only to coverage afforded under 
Section II of this policy." Turning to paragraphs 1 and 2, he 
finds the definitions for "bodily injury" and "medical expenses." 
Any attempt to reconcile those definitions with the language of 
the attachment is futile. One must look further for help in 
determining the meaning of the endorsement. 
Still referring to Section II, as stated in the 
attachment, the reader goes to Part A of the policy, page 3, and 
finds the "GENERAL CONDITIONS" that govern the policy. On Page 4 
he finds a heading entitled "CONDITIONS APPLICABLE ONLY TO 
SECTION II." Unfortunately, that part gives no guidance to the 
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language of the meaning of the attachment because there are no 
definitions included in that section. 
Then the reader must turn to the other parts of the 
policy for guidance in determining the meaning of the attachment. 
Under paragraph 8 of the General Conditions of the Policy, the 
reader finally finds the meaning of the word "insured" as used in 
the policy. Only there does he learn that the word "insured" 
includes the named insured and the residents of his household. 
The language of the attachment is so vague and 
misleading that only law-trained people would ever be able to 
determine what it refers to. The plaintiff and her husband have 
never received legal training. Their depositions reveal that 
they are not even college-trained. The so-called "household 
endorsement" in question sorely lacks the clarity needed to 
advise the plaintiff of the broad exclusion that was intended by 
the insurance company. 
Why didn't the company simply state in the attachment 
to the policy that the personal liability provisions of the 
policy don't apply to the named insured and his family? This 
would have accomplished its purpose in a fair, simple and 
understandable way. Plaintiff suggests that perhaps Prudential 
Insurance Company didn't want its insured to fully understand the 
provisions of the policy. If the average insurance customer 
knew how little coverage he actually receives for his insurance 
dollar, he would be much more selective in choosing the insurance 
he buys. 
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In any event, the "household endorsement", attached to 
plaintiff's insurance policy is so ambiguous that the layperson 
cannot be expected to grasp its meaning or purpose from reading 
the policy. It merely creates a labyrinth of uncertainty and 
lays down a fog of confusion for those who try to translate its 
provisions into a meaningful a document. 
If the court held that the provisions of the household 
exclusion were clear and unambiguous, then the court erred in its 
ruling and should be reversed. The case should be sent back to 
the District Court for a factual determination of the question of 
whether or not the policy provisions were ambiguous. 
POINT NO. V 
THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE 
CONCEPTS OF THE WAGNER CASE 
TO THE MATTER ON APPEAL 
The Adhesion Contract Doctrine has also been referred 
to as the "reasonable expectations" theory in the more recent 
cases because emphasis is given to what the buyer of insurance 
might reasonably expect the policy to cover. The most recent 
Utah case to address this theory is Wagner v. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 62; P2d. (Utah App. 1990). 
In Wagner, plaintiff's decedent was killed in a one car accident, 
and sought a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to 
uninsured motorist benefits in excess of the minimum statutory 
limits. The issue before the Utah Court of Appeals was whether 
the provisions of the insurance policy which excluded coverage 
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should be voided as against pubic policy because the insured 
reasonably expected to be covered in such a situation when he 
purchased the policy." 
The court set forth the plaintiff's arguments as 
follows: 
that the insurance policies are not typical 
contracts in which the terms are bargained for by the 
parties but are, instead, contracts of adhesion. She 
also argues that purchasers commonly expect to be fully 
covered by the insurance they buy, so the insurance 
contract should be essentially rewritten to fulfil [the 
insured's] reasonable expectation of coverage. 
Id. at 63. The court recognized at the outset that automobile 
insurance is usually sold through contracts of adhesion. Id. The 
court also stated its intention "to give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the insured party" where possible. 
The Wagner court would examine three factors to 
determine whether the reasonable expectations concept should be 
applied in a particular case. These are as follows: 
First, whether the insurer knew or should have known of 
the insured's expectation; second, whether the insured 
created or helped create these expectations; and third, 
whether the insured's expectations are reasonable• 
Id. In examining the above three factors, the court would also 
evaluate "extrinsic matters such as the intent of the parties, 
the purpose sought to be accomplished, the subject matter of the 
contract and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the 
policy." Id., (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff wishes to point out that the Wagner case was 
not cited in any of the Briefs and was not mentioned in oral 
argument made to the court. It is probable that the Wagner case 
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had not been decided when the Trial Court made its ruling on 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Nevertheless, that case 
is important to the issues before this court and should not be 
ignored. 
In applying the three factors used in Wagner to resolve 
the reasonable expectations concept, the court should carefully 
examine the facts found in the deposition of Mr. Allen. When the 
family purchased a trampoline, Mr. Allen called the agent on the 
phone and made arrangements to meet him at a hamburger place so 
they could discuss changes in the policy coverages that were 
necessitated by an addition of a trampoline at the family home. 
Mr. Allen told the agent that he was very concerned about the 
trampoline and that he wanted to make sure that anyone who got 
hurt on the trampoline would be covered. He intended to cover 
his own children for such injuries, and he thought he had family 
coverage under the existing policy. At that time the agent knew 
or should have known that Mr. Allen expected the policy to cover 
members of his family. The trampoline circumstances created a 
duty on the agent to explain to Mr. Allen that the policy 
contained an endorsement that excluded liability coverage for his 
family. When the agent failed to make the necessary explanation 
he left the impression with Mr. Allen that his family was 
covered. Because of the agent's failure to meet his obligations 
at that stage, the insured's expectations were reasonable. 
When the concepts announced in the Wagner case are 
applied to the facts and circumstances now before the court, it 
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is obvious that material issues of fact remain to be determined 
by the fact finder before the case can be resolved as a matter of 
law. Again, there is good reason to set aside the Judgment of 
Dismissal entered by the Trial Court and to return the case to 
the District Court for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons stated herein, the Appellate Court should 
reverse the Judgment of Dismissal entered by the Trial Court and 
return the case to the lower court with instructions to proceed 
to trial on the factual issues relating to the Adhesion Contract 
Theory. 
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